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We analyze the loans that startup firms obtain from banks by testing our predictions on a set of 
small,  young  Italian  companies  founded  during  the  1992–2004  period.  According  to  our 
investigation, the amount of borrowing is determined by (1) the size of the firm, (2), the ability to 
offer collateral (3) perceived risk. Contrary to expectations, however, the length of the relationship 






   
The dynamics of entrepreneurial activities and of the start-up firms that entrepreneurs bring to life 
has been a topic of interest to economic researchers for a number of years. Of course, in the end 
entrepreneurial success depends on the skills of the owner-managers and on the financial resources 
at their disposal (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002; Åstebro and Bernhardt, 2003; Hanley and Girma, 
2006).  With  regard  to  the  financial  aspects,  most  part  of  the  existing  research  has  focused  on 
studying the efforts to grow and obtain resources in a long-run perspective (Petersen and Rajan 
(1994), Berger and Udell (1998), Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell (1998)). By contrast, there is 
relatively little systematic knowledge about the borrowing needs of firms immediately after they are 
founded.  
In this paper we aim at filling this gap by considering the short-term loans that banks extend 
to newly founded firms. First, we re-examine the composition of debt, the determinants of bank 
loans and their share in the overall financial structure of young companies. Second, and in addition   3
to standard determinants of credit such as size and profitability, we investigate the role of collateral, 
of bank-firm relationships, of sectorial differences, as well as the interaction among these variables. 
  With this purpose in mind, we consider a sample of small Italian companies created between 
1992 and 2004 and verify whether their behaviour after birth is consistent with our conjectures on 
small-firm finance. In particular, in the next section we briefly survey the literature on bank lending 
to small firms. Sections 3 to 5 describe the small-business institutional environment in Italy, the 
sample of Italian newly-founded companies that form the object of our empirical investigation, the 
main variables taken into account in the analysis. In section 6 we present our empirical results about 
the determinants of capital structure. The traditional empirical model is extended in sections 7 and 
8. Section 9 concludes and offers some suggestion for future research. 
 
2. BANK LOANS TO SMALL FIRMS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
  
By and large, companies finance their activities from two main sources: equity and debt.
1 Equity 
consists of the funds invested by the owners. It is a permanent source of capital, in that there is no 
duty to pay it back or to remunerate it at an agreed-upon rate. It also plays a signaling role. Since 
asymmetric  information  is  remarkably  strong  in  the  case  of  small  firms,  owners  signal  their 
confidence and – indirectly – the quality of their entrepreneurial endeavors by investing their wealth 
in their own firms. The strength and reliability of these signals, however, might not attract enough 
investors  willing  to  risk  their  capital  by  becoming  residual  claimants.  When  this  happens, 
borrowing becomes inevitable, as long as the lender is willing to take at least some risks.   
                                                 
1 The role of trade credit lies beyond the scope of these pages. Yet, although its importance is not 
denied, its role is ambiguous. For instance, Nilsen (2002) suggests that trade credit is a substitute 
for bank loans. Others, such as Berger and Udell (1998) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) find that 
they may be complements.   4
Consistent  with  this  intuition,  Berger  and  Udell  (1998)  argue  that  firms  use  different 
combinations of financing in different growth stages (this is the so-called life cycle theory of firms). 
When small and young, companies suffer from a high informational disadvantage, they find it hard 
to obtain funds from external sources and rely on ‘inside financing’. Later, when they have acquired 
a reputation, owners eventually turn to external sources. In these cases, they prefer debt to equity, so 
as not to dilute ownership and control (Myers, 1984) and tend to concentrate on short-term loans, 
less risky for the lender, and thus cheaper for the borrower (Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008).   
 
2.1  The role of relationships 
Given the role of information asymmetries, during the past decade the literature on bank lending has 
also emphasized the importance of bank-customer relationships and the use of collateral as ways of 
reducing lenders’ mistrust.  In this context, Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) called attention to 
impersonal lending and relationship lending. The former identifies situations in which banks rely on 
the borrowers’ balance sheets in order to assess creditworthiness. The latter applies when banks 
engage  in  acquiring  additional  information  by  interacting  with  their  customers.
2  This  is  called, 
relationship landing. 
 
Relationships benefit both parties. As the assessment of risk becomes more reliable, the quality 
of the bank portfolio improves and the willingness to lend increases. Likewise, the length of the 
relationship reduces the likelihood of collateral requests for the establishment of credit lines. Thus, 
the need to offer collateral becomes less stringent and the cost of borrowing declines. Chakraborty 
and Hu (2006) documented it. These results were also confirmed by Elsas and Krahnen (2004) for 
Germany;  by  Peltoniemi  (2004)  for  Finland;  and  by  Scott  and  Dunkelberg  (2003)  for  the  US. 
                                                 
2  See the important contributions by Black and Strahan (2002), Berger and Udell (2002), 
Bodenhorn (2003), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), Hanley and Girma (2006).   5
Not  surprisingly,  small  companies  benefit  from  relationship  banking  more  than  large  firms,
3 
especially when firms do not produce information that can be processed in a standardized way.  
 
2.2  Information problems and lending technology  
The  finance  literature  distinguishes  between  two  ways  (or  two  'technologies')  in  which  small 
businesses are financed by banks, depending on the type of information which they can provide. On 
one hand, there is a transaction – based lending and on the other relationship lending. The second 
technology is more common in the case of small businesses. In general, the academic literature 
views the "relationship lending" as more relevant to the relatively opaque firm that suffers from 
more intense asymmetric information. However, Berger and Udell (2006) claim that banks often 
lend  to  opaque  small  businesses  using  the  transaction  –  based  approach.  Uchida  Udell  and 
Watanabe (2008), using data from Japan, found that there is a high degree of complementarity 
among these two approaches
4. So, bank maybe using various lending "technologies" at the same 
time. In this study we adopt this approach and do not differentiate between the two technologies. 
Specifically, the two technologies co-exist. The lending bank would use hard information when 
available and supplement it with customer - specific information that is gathered through multiple 
interactions with the same customer over time and across products. 
   
                                                 
3 See Peterson and Rajan (1994), as well as Craig and Hardee (2007). 
4 Uchida Udell and Watanabe (2008) using survey-macro data on Japanese SME's test the 
importance of various "lending technologies" and consider for lending technologies: "financial 
statement lending", "real estate lending", "fixed assets lending" and "relationship lending".  Using 
firm's responses to survey questions they analyze the determinants of each index and find that there 
is complementarity among the four "technologies".    6
   2.3  The role of collateral 
It has been noted in the literature that in the presence of information asymmetries between lenders 
and borrowers collateral may mitigate the problem of adverse selection. Two possible affects are 
considered.  Lenders may  use collateral  either as a substitute for  (Manove, Padilla and Pagano, 
2001) or complement (Longhofer and Santos, 2000) to screening and monitoring efforts. Ono and 
Uesugi (2009) using a firm-level data set of the small and medium size enterprise loan market in 
Japan find that collaterals are used supplements to other documented information. Collateral is 
viewed as effecting in raising the quantity of credit granted.      
Thus, the presence of collateral affects company financing. Since it limits moral hazard and 
adverse selection, it contributes to reducing the assessment costs incurred by the lender. As noted 
by Riding and Haines (2001) and others, the use of costly collateral creates a signaling mechanism 
about the quality of the debt and encourages the borrower to operate efficiently. As a result, the 
amount of credit that the lender is willing to provide increases. The empirical evidence supports the 
theory.  
 
3. BANKS AND SMALL BUSINESSES IN ITALY 
 
Compared to many other Western countries, Italy exhibits a large share of the working population 
categorized as self-employed or as business owners. In Italy, small businesses represent some 95% 
of the total number of firms; they provide almost 47% of total employment and have a significant 
impact on the economic growth of the country  (Istat, 2006). Not surprisingly, lending to small 
business has thus been an important area of interest for both large and small banks.  
Earlier research offered some explanations for this unusual situation. For example, some authors 
have mentioned the diminishing role of scale economies and the increasing role of non-standardized   7
production. Others have drawn attention to the tax benefits that accrue to autonomous workers and 
entrepreneurs. Rapiti (1997) added the relative advantage of small firms in managing turbulent 
industrial relations. Government policy has also played an important role. Since the 1950s, self-
employment and small business ownership have been benefitting from subsidies, tax exemptions, 
privileged pension schemes and further ad hoc legislation.  
Two other features deserve to be underscored. First, in Italy the average company interacts with 
one lead bank and 3.9 other banks at the same time (3.0 other banks in the case of companies 
employing less than 20 people according to Capitalia, 2005).
5 Rajan and Winton (1995) argue that 
this might point to low risk, since one could figure out that the borrower passed several screenings 
successfully. From a different standpoint, however, one might also suggest that multiple lenders are 
evidence of high risk: so high, in fact, that each bank offers funds only as long as other banks are 
willing to share the risk. Second, Italian small companies are characterized by no sharp distinction 
between  ownership  and  control.  As  noted  by  Bianco  and  Casavola  (1999),  in  most  Italian 
companies ownership is highly concentrated. This may be both a blessing and a curse: it might 
constrain future expansion, as output growth often requires a significant amount of outside equity, 
which is unlikely to come from the founder’s pockets; but it might also contribute to reducing 
conflicts and internalizing the outcome of the decision-making process.  
   
                                                 
5 It may also be interesting to compare the Italian context with Norway, where the vast majority of 
firms do business with one bank only (Ongena and Smith, 2001).   8
4. SAMPLE SELECTION AND VARIABLE DEFINITION 
 
We use data collected through a survey conducted in three Northern-Italian regions in 2005-06. It 
includes information about size and industry, as well as on equity and debt. In particular, the data on 
equity are broken up into owner’s savings (including equity positions held by the owner’s family) 
and external funding. For debt we have separate information about bank loans, trade credit and 
government loans. We use bank loans as the depended variable in this study.  
The sample was selected as  follows. First, we  gathered information on 828 new firms that 
entered the ‘Registro delle Imprese’
6 in Lombardia, Piemonte and Veneto during the 1992-2004 
period. We subsequently narrowed our interest on the 286 firms which met two requirements: they 
provided  satisfactory  accounting  data,  they  employed  no  less  than  5  workers  in  2004  if  they 
belonged  to  the  service  or  construction  sectors  and  no  less  than  10  workers  if  they  were  in 
manufacturing. The entrepreneurs heading these firms were then contacted for a personal interview. 
187 of these entrepreneurs made themselves available and provided adequate information.
7  
We have listed in Table 1 the variables we use in order to analyze the determinants of the 
capital structure.  
                                                 
6 The major source of information on the demography of Italian firms is the ‘Registro delle 
Imprese’ (Business Register), managed by the provincial Chambers of Commerce. It lists all 
existing firms by legal status and also includes some information about the owners and the members 
of their boards of directors. All new firms are required by law to register and all firms that cease to 
be active are de-listed.  
7 However, only 24 owners accepted to disclose information about the interest rates paid on their 
debt. 
   More generally, this survey suffers from the standards shortcomings that affect most surveys. For 
instance, we cannot be sure that the respondents understood all the questions and if they did, that 
they answered all of them truthfully. Second, there is the problem of a non-response bias. One can 
never be sure that the answers of those who responded are indeed representative of the general 
population. Finally, since the information that we use is drawn from the successful firms, we might 
be victim to the survivorship bias: firms that opened during 1992-2004 but closed before the survey 
was conducted were not interviewed.    9
TABLE 1 – Definition of the Variables 
 
COLL  A 0-1 variable. One if collateral of any sort is pledged according to notes in the financial 
reports     
FUNDS  All funding sources are expressed as percentage of total assets, using the first financial 
documentation following registration.  
1.  Personal equity out of the owners’ own funds 
2.  Equity investment obtained from other family members 
3.  Equity investment by a family-related firm 
4.  External equity from institutions, including venture capital 
5.  Loans made by banks or bank subsidiaries (mortgage, leasing) 
6.  Government loans and assistance programs (all levels of government) 
7.  Other loans such as trade credits, factoring and customer advances  
IND  the industry to which the startup firm belongs: 
MAN, manufacturing  
  CON, construction 
  BUS, business services, including maintenance, cleaning, printing 
HOS, hospitality, including catering and restaurants 
COM, retail trade 
PES, personal services, including education, health, beauty, repairs  
TRA, transportation, including packaging and storage 
MIS, miscellaneous 
LOAN  Ratio of debt outstanding to total assets 
PRF  Income from ownership and management in 2004 (thousand Euros) 
REL  Number of years during which the firm borrows from the lead bank 
RISK  Failure rate of small firms in the year prior to the establishment of the firm. 
SIZE  Number of salaried employees in the firm (excluding the owner’s family members) 
     10
However, a few key definitions merit attention. Risk is described by the actual rate  
of failure of firms with five or more workers during the year before the firm was established. 
The presumption is that those who plan to start a new firm are informed about the actual average 
failure rate (which is therefore assumed to be highly correlated with the expected failure rate). 
Bank-customer relationship is described by the number of years during which the firm worked with 
its lead bank.
8 The figure was rounded in the usual way. The size of the firm is proxied by the 
number of employees, considered more accurate than financial measures such as sales or size of 
assets: It is more difficult to under-report the number of employees than the amount of revenues. 
Finally,  the  data  regarding  loans  are  taken  from  the  firm’s  balance  sheets  and  include  all 
outstanding debt: spot loans, revolving credit, equipment loans, bridge loans, motor vehicle loans, 
capital leases. The dependent variable (LOAN) is however calculated as the ratio of loans to total 
assets, as in Giannetti (2003) and Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
 
5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Tables 2 to 4 report the main features of the sample. Our companies are fairly small (the average 
number of employees is 16) and have a limited number of owners (4.7 on average, 1.5 of whom 
take an active role in management). 
As noted earlier, small firms tend to rely on personal and family funds for equity, on lending 
from  banks  and  on  trade  credit  for  debt.  On  average,  equity  constitutes  64%  of  total  financial 
resources, debt 36%. In both cases the standard deviations are almost 16%, bearing witness to the 
heterogeneity of firms, especially when it comes to debt. The share of equity in total funding is the 
highest  in  the  transportation  sector  (73%),  whereas  manufacturing  scores  the  highest  marks  in 
                                                 
8 Small firms in Italy appear to be rather loyal to their lead bank.   11
attracting  outside  equity  funds  (about  13%  of  total  funds)  and  government  loans  (5%  of  total 
resources).
9  
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of the owner and of the firm 
 
  N obs   Mean   Std dev.  Median  
         
Years as an employee (previous experience)   193  8.11  3.75  8 
Years with the lead bank   193  6.74  3.88  6 
Hours worked per week by the owner   193  45.56  19.06  50 
Number of employees   192  15.67  14.03  11 
Age of the lead owner   189  45.83  11.65  49 
Number of active owners   193  1.47  0.75  1 
Income of the owner (thousand euro, p.a.)  193  58.20  27.76  50.69 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of the financial structure (as a percent of total assets) 
 
    N  Mean   Std dev.  Median  
           
Total equity     187  64.09  15.86  64 
Sources of equity:   Management ownership  187  43.58  18.59  40 
  Family equity  187  14.70  14.07  14 
  Outside investors   187  5.81  10.50  0 
Total debt     187  35.94  15.85  36 
Sources of debt:   Bank loans  187  20.95  12.94  20 
  Government loans  187  2.33  3.67  0 
  Trade credits   187  12.67  10.07  10 
 
Table 4 – Financial structure by source of funds and industry  
(Means, percent of total assets) 
 
 













               
Lodging and restaurants  28  58.75  1.07  41.25  2.46  20.82  17.96 
Business services  20  61.55  8.80  38.60  1.85  24.65  12.10 
Retail  31  68.90  4.71  31.13  2.32  17.65  11.16 
Building and real estate  20  67.30  1.45  32.70  1.30  15.25  16.15 
Manufacturing   27  58.30  12.56  41.70  5.19  26.07  10.44 
Miscellaneous   24  62.33  8.58  37.67  2.00  23.21  12.46 
Personal services  20  65.80  0.50  34.20  1.75  22.85  9.60 
Transportation  17  72.94  8.82  27.12  0.47  15.94  10.71 
               
Total   187  64.09  5.81  35.94  2.33  20.95  12.67 
 
                                                 
9 In other European countries only 5%-10% of all industrial start-ups have received capital 
contributions from third parties.   12
6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
It is common practice to explain loan volume in terms of characteristics such as relationship, size, 
profitability, and risk (see also the appendix):  
 
LOAN = a + b1SIZE + b2REL + b3PRF + b4RISK + e      (1) 
 
To begin with, we therefore follow the literature by running an OLS regression on equation (1). 
The results are reported in Table 5. As expected, the SIZE variable is positively correlated with the 
volume of loans (in relative terms): larger new firms do tend to have a higher component of debt in 
their liability structure.  
 
With regard to profitability (PRF), figures are often unreliable for a variety of reasons, including 
tax avoidance. We thus prefer to focus on the annual income that the owner-manager takes out from 
the firm. We conjecture that since retained earnings are indeed a form of financing, their presence 
could lessen the need to borrow. Table 5 confirms the prediction, but only in part: the coefficient is 
rather small and generally not significant. 
 
The RISK variable in Table 5 is the actual failure rate of firms in the three regions during the 
year that preceded registration. We expect this variable to be negatively associated with the role of 
debt:  riskier  firms  find  few  lenders  when  they  begin  operations.  This  variable  behaves  in  the 
expected way, but is not significant.  
     13
Table 5 – Determinants of bank landing: OLS regressions                          
– (Dependent variable: bank loans) 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
             
Firm's size (# employees)  0.421***           
  (3.23)           
Log of firm's size    6.898***  8.519***  7.205***  7.216***  8.955*** 
    (2.66)  (3.29)  (2.81)  (2.75)  (3.54) 
Profitability measure   -0.069  -0.032  -0.068  0.030  -0.008  -0.007 
  (-1.01)  (-0.46)  (-0.97)  (0.46)  (-0.12)  (-0.10) 
Risk year  -0.556  -0.780  -0.799  -0.457  -0.669  -0.465 
  (-0.79)  (-1.08)  (-1.07)  (-0.67)  (-0.94)  (-0.67) 
Length of bank relationship  0.318  0.164  -2.861*  0.115  0.184  -3.129** 
  (0.89)  (0.46)  (-1.94)  (0.34)  (0.53)  (-2.23) 
Length of bank relationship squared      0.215**      0.231** 
      (2.23)      (2.53) 
Outside equity as % of total assets        -0.374***    -0.388*** 
        (-4.96)    (-5.30) 
Outside equity (dummy)          -4.017**   
          (-2.03)   
Constant  18.724***  7.947  14.449**  4.121  6.123  10.947 
  (3.59)  (1.30)  (2.09)  (0.70)  (1.00)  (1.60) 
N obs  163  163  163  163  163  163 
R-Squared  0.131  0.119  0.156  0.192  0.136  0.234 
Adj. R-Squared  0.109  0.097  0.129  0.166  0.108  0.204 
Heteroschedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates  
 
 
We define relationship (REL) as the number of years during which the company had "service 
relations"  with  the  lead  bank.  These  include  not  only  borrowing  relations,  but  also  covers 
commercial activities such as managing  a checking account. Consistent with the literature, one 
would expect that REL enhances the debt component of small companies. The results put forward 
in the first and second columns of Table 5, however, seem to suggest that this variable has no 
influence on the firms’ financial structure.    14
One might speculate that Italian banks are fast learners, or that bank-firm relationships in Italy 
are  easier  than  elsewhere.  Or  perhaps  that  competition  is  so  intense  that  nobody  cares  about 
relationships: "[…] firms with multiple bank relationships have more than one potential source of 
inside bank financing and should therefore face lower switching costs and be less susceptible to 
hold  up  threats  by  any  one  bank."  (Ongena  and  Smith,  2001).  Another  possibility  is  that 
relationships are not linear. This hypothesis actually finds some support in column 3, where REL
2 
shows the possible existence of a U-shaped curve: when banks rely on relationships, the length of 
the relationship would reveal the trustworthiness of the borrower as the banker perceives it. Hence, 
when  the  relationship  does  not  last,  it  means  that  the  bank  deems  the  potential  borrower  as 
‘dangerous’ and is therefore reluctant to finance him; on the other hand, when the relationship 
extends over a long period of time, it signals confidence and thus justifies substantial lending.  
Finally, we also make two attempts to take into account outside-equity, i.e. the funds that non-
family investors add to the capital of the firm. These are usually institutional investors, such as 
subsidiaries  of  larger  corporations,  financial  institutions  and  venture  capitalists.  Their  overall 
contribution to the financial structure of small firms in Italy is less than 6%, but is statistically 
significant and seems to be a substitute for bank loans (see columns 4 and 5 in table 5).  
 
7. THE IMPACT OF COLLATERAL AND INDUSTRY COMPOSITION 
 
As observed in section 2, there are good theoretical reasons to believe that the presence of collateral 
does  affect  the  interaction  between  small  firms  and  banks.  Thus,  in  this  section  the  traditional 
analysis is enriched by considering two extra variables. COLL is a dummy that takes value one if 
the firm posts a collateral, zero otherwise. On the other hand, IND takes into account possible   15
industrial irregularities and is equal to one for each of the industry groups listed in columns 2 to 6 in 
Table 6.    
 
LOAN = a + b1SIZE + b2PRF + b3RISK + b4REL + b5COLL + b6IND + e  (2) 
 
The regression run on (2) presents the expected positive sign for COLL: collateral does seem to 
reduce agency costs and lead to larger loans. On the other hand, the results regarding IND suggest 
that sectorial differentiation is relevant in two cases only: Firms in the building and transportation 
industries appear to obtain significantly smaller amounts of loans from banks, while personal and 
business services get considerably more. Perhaps the latter case is due to the presence of ‘work 
under contract’ situations, which are typical of the service sector and are frequently mentioned in 
the pre-loan documentation. By doing so, potential borrowers bear witness to a stable demand for 
their services and thus to the availability of the future cash flow required to serve their debts.  
     16
Table 6 – Determinants of bank landing – Dependent variable: bank loans 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
               
Log of firm's size  6.345**  6.109**  5.748**  7.413***  6.514**  5.732**  6.767** 
  (2.53)  (2.37)  (2.30)  (2.94)  (2.37)  (2.15)  (2.30) 
Length of bank relationship  -2.352*  -2.441*  -2.303*  -2.603**  -2.351*  -2.411*  -2.542** 
  (-1.76)  (-1.85)  (-1.79)  (-2.00)  (-1.76)  (-1.79)  (-2.04) 
Bank relationship squared  0.175**  0.181**  0.172**  0.195**  0.174*  0.176**  0.191** 
  (1.98)  (2.07)  (2.01)  (2.27)  (1.98)  (1.99)  (2.31) 
Profitability measure   -0.069  -0.069  -0.073  -0.098  -0.068  -0.046  -0.112 
  (-1.06)  (-1.05)  (-1.11)  (-1.51)  (-1.05)  (-0.61)  (-1.50) 
Risk year  -0.705  -0.717  -0.721  -1.091  -0.753  -0.664  -1.124 











*  9.869*** 
  (6.01)  (5.99)  (5.89)  (6.22)  (6.02)  (6.01)  (6.08) 
Industry class: Retail     -1.538          -4.359 
    (-0.66)          (-1.56) 
Building and transportation     
-
7.297***       
-
8.714*** 
      (-4.04)        (-3.79) 
Business and personal 
services        5.853***      1.765 
        (2.95)      (0.71) 
Industry class: Manufacturing          -0.636    -2.616 
          (-0.24)    (-0.85) 
Lodging Catering 
Restaurants            1.813  -2.316 
            (0.70)  (-0.77) 
Constant   13.680**  14.812** 
16.951**
*  14.114**  13.590**  13.611** 
20.642**
* 
  (2.19)  (2.34)  (2.76)  (2.37)  (2.15)  (2.16)  (3.49) 
               
N obs  163  163  163  163  163  163  163 
R-Squared  0.310  0.312  0.365  0.347  0.310  0.312  0.390 
Adj. R-Squared  0.283  0.281  0.336  0.317  0.279  0.281  0.346 
Heteroschedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates  
 
8. HANDLING POSSIBLE ENDOGENEITY 
 
Although the empirical analysis put forward in the previous sections seems to generate better, more 
significant results than the traditional literature, it may suffer from two potential weaknesses. One 
regards the quality of the data, which are derived from a survey that is vulnerable to the standard   17
problems of most surveys (see section 4). A second one relates to endogeneity, since it could be 
argued that loans (the dependent variable) are indeed determined by the size of the borrower, but 
that at the same time firms might grow larger as a result of the loans they are able to obtain.  
In order to tackle the endogeneity problem, we run a two-stage least-squares regression. In the 
first stage we consider firm size as the dependent variable and use two industries (manufacturing 
and hospitality) as instrumental variables. Table 6 shows that both variables are uncorrelated with 
LOAN (conditional on the other covariates), but that they are significantly and positively correlated 
with size, the endogenous variable. The validity of the instruments is further supported by the F and 
Sargan tests reported at the bottom of Table 7, where the TSLS results are detailed.  
Table 7 – Two-stage Least Squares – Dependent variable: bank loans 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
             
Log of firm's size  9.904**  12.275**  9.930**  10.484**  12.438**  8.447* 
  (1.97)  (2.34)  (2.07)  (2.09)  (2.48)  (1.82) 
Profitability measure   -0.089  -0.140  -0.021  -0.069  -0.072  -0.040 
  (-0.85)  (-1.28)  (-0.21)  (-0.66)  (-0.69)  (-0.42) 
Risk year  -0.802  -0.828  -0.474  -0.687  -0.486  -0.400 
  (-1.01)  (-1.07)  (-0.62)  (-0.87)  (-0.65)  (-0.60) 
Length of bank relationship  0.120  -3.315**  0.075  0.138  -3.554***  -2.824** 
  (0.34)  (-2.52)  (0.22)  (0.39)  (-2.82)  (-2.47) 
Length of bank relationship squared    0.244***      0.258***  0.203*** 
    (2.75)      (3.04)  (2.64) 
Outside equity as % of total assets      -0.378***    -0.394***  -0.373*** 
      (-3.84)    (-4.09)  (-4.32) 
Outside equity (dummy)        -4.234*     
        (-1.82)     
Collateral            9.677*** 
            (5.85) 
Constant  4.336  11.061  0.813  2.117  7.757  8.912 
  (0.56)  (1.49)  (0.11)  (0.27)  (1.09)  (1.39) 
             
N obs  163  163  163  163  163  163 
Adj. R-Squared  0.089  0.117  0.159  0.099  0.194  0.350 
F test of excluded instruments  26.78  24.24  26.64  26.29  24.10  22.46 
Sargan test (over-identification of the 
instruments)  0.010  0.006  0.128  0.065  0.123  0.120 
Sargan test p-value  0.922  0.940  0.721  0.798  0.726  0.729 
Heteroschedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates     18
 To conclude, by comparing the results of table 7 – in which the reverse causality mechanism is 
removed – with those of tables 5 and 6, we observe that the effect of the covariates on the volume 
of bank loans remains by and large the same: The risk and profitability variables work in the same 
direction and are still not significant. The effect of relationship is also unchanged. In particular, firm 
size continues to have a positive impact on the volume of bank loans and confirms the intuition that 




The main findings of this paper about bank lending to newly founded firms can be summarized as 
follows. Despite the limitations of our sample, we note that the borrowing capacity of young firms 
depends  on  their  size  and  on  the  collateral  their  owners  can  offer.  By  contrast,  the  role  of 
relationship seems rather weak. 
  More generally, this paper also shows that exploring and formulating a general theory about 
the determinants of capital structure in small firms remains a difficult job. Deeper study in this area 
is surely necessary, so as to incorporate other potentially relevant elements. For instance, future 
research might focus on the innovative content of the firm activities, a variable that our dataset did 
not allow to explore. Furthermore, not all small businesses are equally small when it comes to 
capital requirements: Capital-intensive firms probably need more financing and have longer time 
horizons than labor-intensive companies, thereby altering the bargaining power of the founder, both 
with potential lenders and with potential equity contributors. The dynamics of credit markets should 
also be taken into account, for both borrowers and lenders may alter their behavior in accordance 
with the monetary cycle and the institutional context (e.g. tolerable taxation, effective judiciary). 
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